In this paper we examine the impact on the salaries of free agents in Major League Baseball of differences in state and local individual income taxes between major league cities, in an attempt to see if income taxes affect player salaries. Our basic specification suggests that each percentage point of an income tax raises free agent salaries by $21 to $24 thousand; other estimates indicate even larger impacts. Our findings suggest that the existence of this additional salary demand means that low tax cities (e.g., Florida, Texas, and Washington) have a "home field advantage" in the baseball free agent market. 
Introduction
The theory of tax incidence suggests that taxes will fall on fixed factors of production, while mobile factors will largely be able to avoid bearing the burden of a tax. It is hard to imagine many factors of production more mobile than free agent professional athletes about to sign a new contract. As such, an expectation about those contracts is that there will be a divergence between the tax inclusive payment made by a team and the tax exclusive payment received by the players. Assuming that free agents compare after-tax bids from prospective teams, offers that seem nominally identical will differ in their face value by the degree to which state (and local) taxes, especially state individual income taxes, differ in the playing sites.
The issue of taxation of professional athletes is particularly important in Major League
Baseball (MLB). For example, in 2001 the Seattle Mariners' Aaron Sele and the Detroit Tigers' Dean Palmer both had a contractual, pre-tax salary of $7,500,000. However, Palmer's salary was reduced by $315,000 from the State of Michigan's income tax and by an additional $93,750 from the City of Detroit's income tax, reducing his pre-tax salary by $408,750 (assuming individual filing). In contrast, Sele was able to keep the entire $7.5 million since neither Washington nor Seattle imposes income taxes. However, if Sele had been traded to the New York Yankees (at the same salary), he would have owed even more than Palmer ($801,750) in state and local taxes. As another especially telling example -and one based on actual eventsduring the winter between the 2002 and 2003 seasons, a trade between Florida, Colorado, and Atlanta involving several players and about $200 million in contracts almost fell through in its final stages when one player (Charles Johnson) refused to void a no-trade clause in his contract until he was compensated by an additional $1,000,000 to offset additional tax liability due to his move from Miami (with no Florida individual income tax) to Colorado (where an income tax of nearly 5 percent was imposed). Differing rates of state and local income taxes can therefore cause significantly different after-tax salary results. It seems likely that free agent pre-tax salaries will reflect these differences in income taxes. However, despite the large and growing literature on the determinants of individual baseball player salaries, it is striking that (to our knowledge) there is no empirical evidence on this issue. There is also little empirical evidence from other professional sports in which the same considerations most likely arise (e.g., football, basketball, hockey).
1
State and local practices in income tax make the issue of taxing professional athletes of significant importance. All states with an individual income tax reserve the right to tax any nonresident on professional income earned in the state. This policy applies to any non-resident, but it is typically applied mainly to high-profile -and high-income -professional athletes like MLB players.
2 The most commonly used allocation method is based on "duty days", or the number of days that the player spends in providing professional services in a state; the total salary of the player is then allocated across states in which he plays in accordance with the proportion of the total duty days spent in each state, and the player is required to file an individual income tax return in all states in which he plays and in which an income tax is imposed, either at the state or 1 A recent exception is Kopkin (2011) , who finds that state and local income tax rates affect the "migration" of National Basketball Association (NBA) free agents from one location to another. Note that much empirical work on the impact of marginal tax rates on the compensation of high income individuals indicates a significant behavioral response. For example, see Goolsbee (2000) , Alm and Wallace (2000) , and Bakija and Slemrod (2004) . For a contrary view, see Young and Varner (2011) . 2 Some states have reciprocity agreements with other states, in which taxes paid to one state can be credited against the tax liability of another state. However, despite these reciprocal agreements, there is often double taxation of professional athletes. See Ekmekjian (1994) , Ringle (1995) , Green (1998) , Barger (1999) , Hawkins, Slay, and Wallace (2002), and Hoffman (2002) , in order to examine how income taxes affect player salaries. We find in our basic specification that individuals choosing to play in cities with income taxes must be paid higher pre-tax salaries, by an amount that ranges from $21 to $24 thousand for each percentage point of a state and local income tax; other estimates suggest even larger impacts. We then point out the implications for sports salary modeling, as well as the implications for major league baseball from state and local tax differences, differences that are presumably unintended and certainly outside the control of baseball. Our basic conclusion is that free agents are mobile factors of production, and, as a result, they bear little of the burden of individual income taxes.
Modeling the Determinants of Baseball Player Salaries
Because so much information is available relating to player productivity in baseball, a rich literature has developed investigating the relationship between the value of player performance and team revenue generation (e.g., a player's marginal revenue product, or MRP).
A major issue in this literature has been the degree to which MRP and salary tend to diverge as a result of monopsony power on the part of teams. Prominent in this literature are contributions by Scully (1974) , Zimbalist (1992), and Fort (1992) . More recently, Krautmann (1999) has demonstrated that the existence of an open and competitive market for players eligible for free agency allows salaries for free agents to be more directly tied to relevant productivity factors.
See also recent empirical studies by Bradbury (2007) , Healy (2008) , Brown and Jepsen (2009) , and Krautmann and Solow (2009) .
At question for our work here is which of the many player productivity variables might best predict salary. Everyday position players have both offensive and defensive characteristics, with some degree of differentiation among various attributes. The important offensive contributions of, say, a lead-off hitter, a number two hitter, or a clean-up hitter will vary, just as the important defensive characteristics of catchers, infielders, and outfielders are not the same.
Nevertheless, most researchers have found that there exists a wide range of variables that are correlated with salaries and, indeed, that simple models are often as effective as complicated ones (Fort, 1992) . On the other hand, empirical models for pitchers tend not to be as successful in explaining pitcher salaries, given the apparent difficulties in aggregating over different types of pitching measures (Krautmann, Gustafson, and Hadley, 2003; Bradbury, 2007) ). Underlying all of these models is the presumption that past performance predicts future salary. Since it is future salary and not future performance that is being predicted, past performance seems a reasonable indicator.
What role do state income taxes play in determining player salaries? The theory of tax incidence suggests that taxes will be shifted from mobile factors to fixed factors (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002) . Since free agent baseball players are quite mobile, certainly more mobile than the baseball franchises for whom the players work, this theory implies that franchises will bear the bulk of the burden of state income tax differences. However, to the extent that franchises are themselves footloose, as in the case of new franchises or relocations of existing franchises, then local governments compete extensively through tax breaks to win franchises (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997) . In any event, free agents cannot be considered fixed factors, and so they should effectively escape the incidence of state income taxes. Consequently, we argue that players will compare after-tax salary offers, whereas reported salaries -and those salaries tested in all other baseball salary models to date -are invariably pre-tax salaries. 3 To the extent that these two figures differ by any considerable amount, there is a clear misspecification of the salary models.
Do State and Local Taxes Differ Across Baseball Sites?
An important, prior empirical issue is whether state and local taxes differ to any significant degree across team sites. The answer to this question is "Yes". Five of the thirty MLB teams are in sites with no state or local income tax: Miami, Tampa Bay, Houston, Texas, and Seattle. Aside from the marginal tax rate variable, we also include a full array of control variables, including major league experience and other standard performance indicators for both pitchers and non-pitchers. We choose this period because it covers the entire period after the cancellation of the 1994 season and through the expiration in 2001 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the major league baseball clubs and the players association.
Denote S it as the pre-tax salary of free agent i in period t. We assume that the basic relationship between the explanatory variables and the free agent salary is given by:
(plus a constant term), where MTR it is a variable that measures the sum of state and local marginal tax rates for free agent i in period t, X it is a vector of performance indicators that determine the salary of free agent i in period t,  i and  t are individual fixed and annual time effects, (,  ) are the relevant coefficients on the marginal tax rate and the performance indicators, and  it is a random error term. Note that free agents playing in a state for which there is no state or local income tax have a value of MTR it equal to 0. We follow the previous literature by including a very wide range of performance indicators in numerous specifications, 7 Individual fixed effects capture any permanent differences across free agents (e.g., innate abilities) not otherwise captured by other explanatory variables. Similarly, the time effects capture any variation in free agent salaries over time that affects the whole country (e.g., changes in MLB franchise laws, federal income taxes).
and we also explore alternative functional form specifications (e.g., quadratic, log-linear, loglog), all in an attempt to demonstrate the robustness of our results.
The fixed-effects model seems appropriate for our analysis for two reasons. First, much of the variation in free agent salaries is between individuals rather than within the same individual over time. Although it would be difficult to specify all the characteristics that determine the differences across individuals in free agent salaries, we can capture permanent differences between free agents with individual fixed-effects. Similarly, there are many factors that may affect free agent salaries over time, and we capture those differences with annual time effects. Second, the fixed-effects model is a within-group estimator that uses a weighted average of the within-individual and the across-individual variation to form the parameter estimates.
Therefore, our estimate of the effects of state and local income tax variations measures how free agent salaries change within panels of free agents due to the presence or absence of a state and local income tax. Nonetheless, we also estimate similar specifications with a random-effects model, and our results are largely unaffected. 8 Results from the Hausman (1978) specification test indicate that the fixed effects model is a better fit. All standard errors are estimated using the White (1980) procedure for robust standard errors.
Data
Our dependent variable is the annual pre-tax salary of baseball free agent i for time period t, measured in thousands of dollars. We obtain information on free agent salaries and other performance indicators for the years 1995 through 2001 from the MLB website, for all MLB clubs. We include several explanatory variables to measure the effect of state income taxes on salaries across free agents and over time. Our primary regressor is the top marginal tax rate in the state and local income tax (where imposed); given that the top marginal tax rate applies to incomes well below the salary of free agents, there is little concern with potential endogeneity of the MTR it variable. 9 Our expectation is that the estimated coefficient on MTR it will be positive; that is, a player signing a contract in a city with a state and/or a local income tax will require that the pre-tax salary of the free agent be higher in order to compensate for the added income tax liability, in an amount the depends on the presence and on the magnitude of the income tax in the city and the state. We estimate several variants on the basic specification in equation (1), including those that are quadratic in MTR it , that are in log-linear form (e.g., S it is measured in natural log form), and that are in log-log form (e.g., both S it and MTR it are in log form).
To assess the impact of state income taxes on free agent salaries, it is necessary to control for other factors that potentially affect these salaries. experimented with some of the more recently devised sabermetrics statistics for non-pitchers and pitchers, such as "base runs" or "runs created", "secondary average", "true average", "range factor", "weighted on-base average", "equivalent average", "peripheral earned run average", "defense-independent earned run average", "walks plus hits per innings pitched", "win shares", "total player rating", and "value over replacement player", to name several. 10 These alternative measures sometimes affect the magnitude of the tax impact on salaries but not its sign. We report the results from the more commonly used performance statistics, but all results are available upon request. To test further the robustness of these results, Table 5 presents fixed effects models for both non-pitchers and pitchers that examine the impact of different ways of introducing MTR it .
Estimation Results
Variant 1 repeats the fixed effects results for non-pitchers and pitchers as reported in Tables 3   and 4 . Variant 2 introduces the marginal tax rate in a quadratic form (or MTR plus MTR Squared). Variant 3 uses a simple log-linear specification where S it is measured in its natural log form, and Variant 4 estimates a standard log-log specification. Other variables are entered in the same way as in the basic fixed effects specifications of Tables 3 and 4 .
These results indicate somewhat variable quantitative impacts of the state and local income tax on free agent salaries. Even so, all variants clearly indicate that a state and local income tax has a positive and significant qualitative impact on free agent salaries. For example, the quadratic specification suggests that the dollar impact on salaries of the income tax increases (not decreases) with an increase in the marginal tax rate. Similarly, the log-linear variant indicates that the percentage response of salaries to an increase in the marginal tax rate is about 2 to 3 percent. The log-log specification shows an elasticity of salaries with respect to the marginal tax rate slightly in excess of 0.5. All variants point to the importance of state and local income taxes in free agent salary determination.
Conclusions and Implications
There is a wide range of state and local income tax rates among cities with baseball franchises. This range generates a marginal rate difference of up to 10 percentage points between those cities in the U.S. with an income tax and the five no-tax cities. Our estimation results indicate that these tax differences are largely reflected in pre-tax salary offers to free agent MLB players: free agents are highly mobile, and they are able to ask for and receive pretax salaries that largely compensate them for the state and local income taxes that they must pay if playing in cities with an income tax.
To illustrate, the average salary of a MLB player in 2001 was $2.2 million. If the average top marginal tax rate in state and local income taxes is approximated by 7 percent, as indicated in the descriptive statistics of Table 2 , then a player choosing the free agent offer of a city with an income tax over a city without one would incur an additional statutory income tax liability of roughly $150,000. 11 Our estimation results vary somewhat in their precise implications, but even so our basic specification suggests that each percentage point of a state and local income tax raises free agent salaries by $21 to $24 thousand, a result that is broadly similar to the increased statutory tax liability; other variants give largely similar estimates. In short, income taxes are largely shifted away from mobile players to other factors, such as the franchise itself or immobile factors in the city.
There are other implications of our results as well. The total 2001 payroll for all MLB teams was in total $1.9 billion, of which $1.6 billion was incurred by franchises operating in states with a state and local income tax. Again assuming that average top marginal tax rate is roughly 7 percent, the franchises in states with an income tax paid an additional $20 million to compensate players for the additional income taxes to which their players were subject.
11 Note also that in 2001 three-fourths of all states with an individual income tax imposed a top marginal tax rate of between 5 and 9 percent; local income taxes impose additional burdens. See Table 1 $13,166,667) . 12 Of these five top earners, the salaries of all -notably except Rodriquez -were subject to significant state and local income taxes that ranged from about 5 percent (for Johnson) to roughly10 percent (for Brown, Piazza, and Vaughn). Our estimation results suggest that the ownership of the teams in states with income taxes had to increase significantly the pre-tax salaries of these players in order to sign them. In contrast, the Texas Rangers got a relative bargain in Rodriguez given the absence of any state/local income tax in Texas. Similar adjustments were necessary for other free agent players.
The basic implication of this tax difference is that there is a competitive edge -a "home field advantage" -for teams in low-tax areas because they have lower team expenses in signing free agents to contracts that pay the same after-tax wage to players. After correcting for multiple tax venues, Florida, Tampa Bay, Texas, Houston, and Seattle may be able to sign free agents at a salary savings of from 2 to 3 percent relative to other clubs.
This result leads to other implications as well. Because player contracts are assignable in MLB, clubs in low-tax cities will find it easier to trade players to new teams because those players will have relatively lower salaries. Trades in baseball are frequently motivated by a desire to "dump salary". When the salaries of those players being dumped are lower to begin with, trades will be easier to negotiate and may bring better terms for low tax cities.
On the other hand, in order to counter an abrupt and undesired change of teams, players commonly negotiate limited no-trade clauses in their contracts. Whereas these clauses are commonly thought of as restricting player movement to other clubs that tend to be more competitive or to clubs in areas with player-desired amenities, it is likely that an examination of clubs to which players with trade restrictions would allow themselves to be traded would reveal a disproportionate representation of low-tax cities.
Finally, the salary savings advantage for low-tax franchises will be magnified by the present "luxury tax" system among teams. In order to maintain competitive balance and slow the overall growth of salaries, MLB has instituted a system by which teams with the total annual payrolls above a "threshold" must pay an additional "luxury tax" on all payroll above the limit, with the tax payments then distributed to teams with the lowest payrolls. Since clubs in high tax cities find they must pay more for the same players, the luxury tax distorts in favor of teams in low tax cities. For example, in 2003 (the first year in which the luxury tax was imposed), the New York Yankees had player salaries that were $67.5 million above the threshold of $117 million. With a luxury tax rate in 2003 of 17.5 percent, the Yankees paid total taxes of $11.2 million. Our estimation results suggest that as much as $7 million of the above-threshold salaries was due to the existence of state and local income taxes, which implies that over $1 million of the luxury tax was due to the income taxes. The likelihood that state and local income taxes contributed to higher player salaries exacerbated the penalty imposed on the Yankees.
In short, free agent salaries are affected at least in part by the existence of individual income taxes. Players choosing to play in high-tax cities demand -and receive -higher free agent salaries as compensation. This phenomenon should be recognized in studies of the determinants of player salaries, as well as in the analysis of other aspects of the market for professional baseball players. 
Log-log Variant
Ln MTR 0.66** (2.93) 0.51** (2.31) Coefficient estimates from a fixed effects regression are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
